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Abstract
This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of
static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize
all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e.
we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective.
Third, we introduce a reliable way to measure competition in dynamic markets with non-
linear pricing. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach in several ways. We reproduce
the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost
margins, yet such markets are not necessarily more competitive. Indeed, we prove the
Schumpeterian conjecture that more dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of
innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our approach
can be used to determine the optimal combination of market regulation and innovation
policies such as R&D subsidies or a weakening of the patent system. Finally, we show
that optimal markets are characterized by strictly positive price-cost margins.
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1. Introduction
Recent antitrust legislation, including the Microsoft and Intel cases and the Glaxo/Wellcome
merger, has rekindled the controversy whether dynamic sectors, where firms invest in R&D to
improve products and production processes, should be treated differently from static sectors,
where products and technologies are more or less given. Specifically, the question is whether
mergers and anti-competitive conduct by firms, e.g. the use of exclusive contracting, tying, and
bundling, should be evaluated more leniently for dynamic sectors. This question dates back
to Schumpeter (1942) – the main reason no consensus has emerged is the lack of a tractable
framework in which (i) the welfare effects of competition and innovation can be evaluated and
(ii) competition can be measured in a reliable way.
Regarding (i), the current literature that studies the effects of competition on innovation is
positive, not normative, in nature: if an industry becomes more competitive, does innovation
increase? Schumpeter (1942) argued that monopoly power is needed to foster innovation. An
opposing viewpoint was first expressed by Arrow (1962), who formalized the idea that competi-
tion stimulates innovation. Many subsequent theoretical papers surveyed by Vives (2008) and
Schmutzler (2010) indeed find a positive relation between competition and innovation (although
exceptions exist). This suggests that competition policy should be more aggressive for dynamic
sectors: as in static sectors, more intense competition leads to lower prices and, hence, less
deadweight loss, and, in addition, competition stimulates innovation. However, this inference
is logically incorrect – a normative conclusion cannot follow from a positive observation.
The correct normative question is whether the welfare-maximizing competition intensity
is higher in dynamic sectors. To underline that normative and positive implications need
not coincide, below we introduce a model where more intense competition, in the sense of
lower price-cost margins, leads to more innovation.1 Yet, the welfare-maximizing competition
intensity is lower in dynamic sectors.
Regarding (ii), how should competition intensity be measured in dynamic sectors? Evans
& Schmalensee (2001), Gilbert & Tom (2001), Hahn (2001), Katz & Shelanski (2005), and
Katz & Shelanski (2007) provide arguments why standard competition measures, including
concentration, profits, and price-cost margins, are misleading in dynamic sectors. That is,
high concentration, high profits, and a high price-cost margin do not necessarily imply a lack of
1Although the empirical evidence is also somewhat mixed, recent papers that document a positive effect of
competition on innovation/productivity include Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith & Howitt (2005), Bassanini
& Ernst (2002), Galdon-Sanchez & Schmitz (2002), Nickell (1996), Symeonidis (2002), and Porter (1990).
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competition. In order to measure competition in a meaningful and reliable way, we introduce an
alternative index that applies to both static and dynamic industries. The intuitive idea behind
our competition index is that more competitive industries exhibit more payoff inequality, i.e.
profit differences across firms of varying efficiency levels grow when competition increases.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a framework in which the welfare effects
of competition can be analyzed, taking into account the effects of competition on innovation.
To allow for a general yet tractable analysis, we use a mechanism design approach to describe
the set of market equilibria. We prove Schumpeter’s conjecture that dynamic markets should
be less competitive, even when more intense competition leads to more innovation. We further
illustrate the usefulness of our approach by considering the interaction between competition
regulation and innovation policies.2 Finally, we show that optimal markets are characterized
by strictly positive price-cost margins.
Our paper adds to a large and growing theoretical literature that considers the relation be-
tween competition and innovation, see, for instance, the surveys by Vives (2008) and Schmut-
zler (2010) and references therein. Compared to previous literature, our approach has several
distinguishing features that we detail below: (i) we apply a mechanism design approach to
characterize market equilibria, (ii) we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies
from a welfare perspective, and (iii) we introduce a novel way to measure competition. Im-
portantly, we allow for the possibility of non-linear pricing since this is common practice in
many dynamic sectors, e.g. the telecom, pharmaceutical, semi-conductor, software, PC, cable,
and petroleum-refining industries. Also many static sectors, including the airline and cereal
industries, frequently employ non-linear pricing. In contrast to prior literature, we therefore do
not assume that firms are restricted to use linear prices.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodological advances of our
approach. In Section 3 we reproduce the positive finding that innovation levels are higher in
markets with lower price-cost margins. We define the planner’s welfare-maximization problem
and derive the optimal market structure. In Section 4 we consider implications for regulatory
design and prove Schumpeter’s conjecture that more dynamic markets should be less compet-
itive. For ease of exposition we make a number of simplifying assumptions to establish these
results, which are relaxed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2Segal & Whinston (2007) analyze how innovation is affected by antitrust policies that restrict incumbent
behavior, e.g. the use of exclusive contracts or predatory behavior. The basic tradeoff is that the protection
of entrants raises their profits initially but lowers their profits once they become incumbents. In general, the
effect of entrant protection on their (discounted) profits and innovation levels is not clear cut but cases can be
identified where it results in higher levels of innovation.
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2. Methodological Advances
In this section we introduce three methodological innovations to study the design of static and
dynamic markets. First, we conduct a normative analysis whereas most policy conclusions are
currently derived from positive results, e.g. whether or not competition stimulates innovation.
Second, to study the impact of competition on innovation and welfare in a general yet tractable
way, we employ a mechanism design approach to characterize all market equilibria. Third, we
introduce a robust measure of competition. Many papers that study the correlation between
competition and innovation use the price-cost margin as a measure of competition. As we argue
below, when firms can reduce their production costs and use non-linear pricing, the price-cost
margin is not a reliably measure. We end this section with a simple example to illustrate why
the informational rents needed to ensure incentive compatibility preclude perfectly-competitive
market outcomes.
2.1. Normative Approach
The discussion whether competition policy should be less or more strict in dynamic sectors
typically focuses on the positive question whether more intense competition stimulates inno-
vation. For example, the “Schumpeterian school,” e.g. Katz & Shelanski (2005) and Ahlborn,
Denicolo, Geradin & Padilla (2006), argues that competition policy should be more permissive
in dynamic sectors because market power fosters innovation. However, a normative analysis is
needed to justify this conclusion, i.e. competition policy should be more permissive only if the
welfare-maximizing level of competition is lower in dynamic sectors. To underline the impor-
tance of a normative approach, below we introduce a model that replicates the finding of most
theoretical papers that more intense competition (in the sense of lower price-cost margins) leads
to more innovation. Yet, we show that the welfare-maximizing competition intensity should
be lower in dynamic sectors compared to static ones, and, hence, competition policy should be
less (not more) strict.
2.2. Mechanism Design
The effect of competition on innovation is typically analyzed for specific market environments.
For instance, a common approach is to assume Cournot or Betrand competition and determine
the effects of increased product substitutability, see, e.g., Vives (2008), and references therein.
Since a change in the substitution elasticity between products affects utilities, a welfare analysis
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is not meaningful in this context. More importantly, even if we change the degree of competi-
tion without affecting utilities, e.g. by changing conduct in the market, the analysis typically
becomes intractable without providing general insights.
To facilitate a more general analysis, we employ a mechanism design approach to charac-
terize the set of market equilibria. Myerson’s (1981) revelation principle implies that for each
market form there is an equivalent direct mechanism in which it is optimal for a firm to reveal
its true type θ, e.g. the firm’s marginal cost, to receive equilibrium revenue, R(θ), and produce
equilibrium output, q(θ). By specifying a welfare function that takes into account the costs and
benefits of innovation, the mechanism design approach allows us to derive the optimal revenue
and output schedules {R(·), q(·)}. Admittedly, a competition authority or regulator typically
cannot dictate arbitrary output and revenue schedules. However, instruments that implement
incremental changes are possible and the mechanism design approach allows the regulator to
choose such adjustments in an optimal manner. This would not be possible by analyzing only
two (or more) specific market forms such as Bertrand and Cournot competition.3
Indeed, as a consequence of comparing only two specific market forms, the current literature
comes with ambiguous predictions regarding the effects of competition on innovation. For
example, in a recent survey, Schmutzler (2010) stresses that some theoretical papers find that
more competition leads to more innovation while others conclude the opposite. Because the
models in the survey differ in a number of aspects it is hard to grasp what drives these opposite
conclusions. In contrast, as we show below, the mechanism design approach employed in
this paper provides clear-cut predictions about how the optimal level of competition varies in
response to changes in underlying market parameters. Furthermore, it allows us to study the
interaction between market regulation and innovation policies such as R&D subsidies.
2.3. Competition Measure
There are several reasons why the familiar price-cost margin is not suitable as a competition
measure in dynamic markets. First, it may dramatically underestimate market power when
firms can use non-linear pricing. To illustrate, consider a monopolist who uses a two-part tariff
with marginal price equal to marginal cost and a fixed fee to appropriate consumer surplus. To
conclude there is no market power simply because the price-cost margin is zero is incorrect.4
3Suppose for certain parameters, Bertrand competition leads to higher welfare than Cournot competition. If
the current level of competition is somewhere in between Bertrand and Cournot competition, it does not follow
that a small step towards Bertrand competition will increase welfare.
4Calculating the price-cost margin with the fixed fee included does not resolve the problem – it would result
in a positive price-cost margin suggesting there is a deadweight loss. However, depending on the model, there
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Second, in dynamic markets, firms can innovate to reduce their costs. Typically, conditional
on cost, a high price-cost margin is interpreted as evidence of market power. However, condi-
tional on price, a high price-cost margin signals efficiency. In other words, in dynamic markets,
the price-cost margin is an ambiguous measure that cannot differentiate between market power
and efficiency differences.
Third, standard competition measures can be misleading in dynamic industries where com-
petition is often for the market rather than on the market.5 That is, firms compete fiercely
in terms of R&D and the firm with the best product is likely to capture most of the market.
Hence, in terms of market shares, the product market is (very) concentrated. But this does not
imply a lack of competition. Further, as mentioned above, in many dynamic industries (such as
the software and pharmaceutical industries), marginal costs are close to zero resulting in price-
cost margins close to 1. Finally, because R&D involves high risks, the return on a successful
product will be high. Hence, profits in dynamic markets tend to be high, but, again, this does
not imply a lack of competition since the ex ante expected return on R&D investments may be
modest. Thus traditional competition measures such as concentration, price-cost margins, and
profits can be misleading in dynamic sectors.
We therefore employ an alternative measure of competition, which is based on the idea that
competition raises payoff inequality across different types of firms. Our competition measure
is not restricted to markets and can also be applied to other environments, e.g. contests,
auctions, tax schemes, etc. Let F (θ) denote the distribution of firms’ types, with support [θ, θ¯]
and associated density f(θ), and let ΠA(θ) and ΠB(θ) denote the profit of a firm of type θ in
environments A and B respectively. Throughout we use the convention that a higher θ reflects
a more efficient type, e.g. a firm with lower production costs, so that Π′(θ) > 0.
Definition 1. Environment B is more competitive than environment A when ΠB(θ) is a convex
transformation of ΠA(θ), or, equivalently, when IB(θ) ≥ IA(θ) for all θ, where6
I(θ) ≡ Π
′′(θ)
Π′(θ)
(2.1)
Note that I(θ) is unaffected when a constant is added to all payoffs, i.e. lump sum taxes have
need not be such inefficiency.
5See, for instance, Ahlborn et al. (2006), Evans & Schmalensee (2001), Gilbert & Tom (2001), Katz &
Shelanski (2005), and Katz & Shelanski (2007).
6To see that these are equivalent definitions, let φ : IR+ → IR+ denote an increasing function and let
ΠB(θ) = φ(ΠA(θ)). Then IB = IA + (φ′′/φ′)Π′, so IB ≥ IA if and only if φ is convex.
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no effect. Likewise, I(θ) is unaffected when all payoffs are multiplied by a constant, i.e. it is
invariant with respect to changes in the unit of measurement.
To see how Definition 1 relates to payoff inequality, consider the familiar Lorenz curve
L(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
Π(θ)dF (θ)∫ θ¯
θ
Π(θ)dF (θ)
(2.2)
which is increasing in θ with L(θ) = 0 and L(θ¯) = 1. The basic idea behind our notion of more
competition is that it results in an increase in payoff inequality, which means that the Lorentz
curve shifts down.7
Proposition 1. A more competitive environment results in more payoff inequality, i.e. LB(θ) ≤
LA(θ) for all θ.
The next two examples demonstrate how I(θ) can be used to define an increase in competition.
The first example shows that, unlike the price-cost margin, our measure of competition can be
applied to non-market contexts.8
Example 1 (progressive taxes). Consider an education-signaling model a` la Spence, where
workers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to firms consisting of an education level, e, and a wage,
w. If the offer is accepted, the worker’s payoff is Πw = (1 − τw)w − e/(2θ) and the payoff of
the firm is Πf = θ − w, otherwise the worker’s payoff is Πw = −e/(2θ) and the firm’s payoff
is Πf = 0. Here θ ∈ [0, 1] is the workers type or “ability,” which is uniformly distributed and
privately known, and τ < 3/4 plays the role of a progressive tax. It is straightforward to derive
the separating equilibrium for this setup: e(θ) = θ2(1− 4
3
τθ) and w(θ) = θ, resulting in worker
profits of Πw = θ(
1
2
− 1
3
τθ). Hence, our competition measure is
I(θ) = 1
θ − 3
4τ
which is decreasing in τ , i.e. more progressive taxation corresponds to less intense competition
between workers.
7It should be stressed that a similar argument does not apply to the firms’ profits directly. Indeed, an increase
in competition does not preclude higher profits for (some) firms. Consider a homogeneous good duopoly with
linear demand p = 1−q1−q2, where firm i = 1, 2 has constant marginal costs ci. It is routine to verify that for c1
substantially below c2, firm 1 has higher profits under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition,
even though Bertrand is typically seen as more competitive.
8Boone (2008, p. 1250) defines the index I(n) = ln(Cn(q, n)) where C denotes production costs, q output
and n a firm’s efficiency level. For the case of a market context, this index is related to the one of Definition 1.
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Example 2 (Bertrand competition). Consider a model of Bertrand competition with
n ≥ 1 firms. A firm’s constant marginal cost is given by c = 1− θ where θ ∈ [0, 1] is uniformly
distributed and privately known. Demand is D(p) = (1− p)α where α ≥ 0 reflects the demand
elasticity (α = 0 corresponds to the standard example of completely inelastic demand for 1
unit). It is straightforward to show that equilibrium prices are given by9
p(θ) = 1− n+ α− 1
n+ α
θ
with associated profits
Π(θ) =
(n+ α− 1)α
(n+ α)α+1
θn+α
The competition index is readily calculated as
I(θ) = n+ α− 1
θ
i.e. an increase in the number of firms (n) or in the elasticity of demand (α) raises competition.
2.4. Informational Rents
In the mechanism design approach of this paper, an important role is played by firms’ informa-
tional rents needed to ensure incentive compatibility. In this section we illustrate with a simple
example why these informational rents preclude perfectly-competitive outcomes.
Consider a homogeneous good industry with two firms, where each firm is equally likely to
have an efficient cost function cl(q) or an inefficient cost function ch(q), where ch(q) ≥ cl(q)
and c′h(q) > c
′
l(q) for all possible output levels, q. Hence, there are three market constellations,
(cl, cl), (cl, ch), (ch, ch), which occur with probability 1/4, 1/2, and 1/4 respectively. In each
case, the market equilibrium specifies the total level of output, Qll > Qlh > Qhh, which is split
evenly between symmetric firms while in the asymmetric case the efficient firm has a larger
market share x > 1/2.
Suppose the social planner wants to implement equilibrium outcomes that maximize con-
sumer welfare. Standard intuition suggests this can be accomplished by imposing the following
9The profit of a firm of type θ who acts as if of type θ′ is given by
Π(θ′, θ) = (1− p(θ′))α(p(θ′)− (1− θ))θ′n−1
Using the first order condition for θ′ evaluated at θ′ = θ, yields the optimal prices given in Example 2.
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perfect-competition properties: (i) marginal costs are equalized between firms and (ii) price, or
marginal utility, is set equal to marginal cost. However, this intuition is incorrect because it
overlooks the informational rents needed to implement these properties in equilibrium.
Let tl (th) denote the expected transfers to an efficient (inefficient) firm, where the expecta-
tion is taken over the competitor’s type. The relevant constraints are the individual-rationality
constraint for the inefficient firm
th − 12ch((1− x)Qlh)− 12ch(12Qhh) ≥ 0
and the incentive-compatibility constraint for the efficient firm
tl − 12cl(12Qll)− 12cl(xQlh) ≥ th − 12cl((1− x)Qlh)− 12cl(12Qhh)
The planner’s problem can be written as
max
Qll,Qlh,Qhh,x
{
1
4
U(Qll) +
1
2
U(Qlh) +
1
4
U(Qhh)− th − tl
}
subject to the above two constraints. To maximize consumer surplus, transfers are minimized
and chosen such that the above constraints hold with equality. Solving for the transfers in this
manner, the first-order conditions for Qll, Qlh, Qhh, x can be written as
U ′(Qll) = c′l(
1
2
Qll)
U ′(Qlh) = xc′l(xQlh) + (1− x)c′h((1− x)Qlh) + (1− x)
{
c′h((1− x)Qlh)− c′l((1− x)Qlh)
}
U ′(Qhh) = c′h(
1
2
Qhh) +
{
c′h(
1
2
Qhh)− c′l(12Qhh)
}
c′l(xQlh) = c
′
h((1− x)Qlh) +
{
c′h((1− x)Qlh)− c′l((1− x)Qlh)
}
Note that the terms between the curly brackets are strictly positive. Hence, unless both firms
are efficient, price does not equal marginal cost. Moreover, when there is an efficient and
inefficient firm, the market is not split efficiently, i.e. marginal costs are not equalized. In other
words, equilibrium outcomes with the aforementioned perfect-competition properties are not
optimal, i.e. they do not maximize consumer surplus. The reason is that implementing these
outcomes requires high transfers, or informational rents, which lowers consumer surplus.
Generalizing the example to more than two firms and more than two efficiency levels quickly
becomes intractable. This is not the case for the model discussed below, which assumes a
continuum of types.
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3. A Mechanism Design Approach
We use a two-stage model of R&D and market competition. In the first stage, firms invest in
R&D, which determines their efficiency levels, or production costs, for the second stage in which
there is market competition. In particular, the cost to a firm of type θ to achieve efficiency level
n is given by Ψ(n−θ), where Ψ : IR+ → IR+ is increasing so that, ceteris paribus, a higher type
corresponds to a lower R&D cost. In the market-competition stage, firms choose outputs given
their efficiency levels. In particular, when a firm with efficiency level n produces an output q,
its production costs are C(q− n), where C : IR+ → IR+ is increasing so that, ceteris paribus, a
higher efficiency level corresponds to a lower production cost.
Let q(θ) denote the amount of output that consumers purchase from a firm with type θ.
Then consumers’ (gross) utility is given by
∫
U(q(θ))dF (θ), with U(0) = 0, U ′(q) > 0, and
U ′′(q) ≤ 0. If U ′′(q) < 0 then products are differentiated and consumers value variety, while
the linear case U ′′(q) = 0 means products are perfect substitutes.
Assumption 1. Marginal production costs, C ′(·), and marginal R&D costs, Ψ′(·), are increas-
ing and convex. Or, equivalently, the “supply functions” ψ(·) ≡ Ψ′(−1)(·) and c(·) ≡ C ′(−1)(·)
are increasing and concave.
Note that, roughly speaking, the requirement is that R&D and production costs are quadratic
or more convex.
Assumption 2. The hazard rate f(θ)/(1− F (θ)) is non-decreasing.
A non-decreasing hazard-rate is equivalent to log-concavity of the density f(·), and, hence, the
distribution function, F (·). The class of log-concave densities includes many well-known and
commonly-used densities, e.g. the normal, uniform, and exponential densities.
Assumptions 1 and 2 can be relaxed considerably, see the discussion in Section 5. They are
imposed here to streamline the presentation, in particular, to ensure uniqueness and regularity
of the optimal market structure.
The output a firm chooses depends not only on its efficiency level but also on the market
structure the regulator offers, as characterized by the revenue-output menu, {R(·), q(·)}. So
when a firm chooses a production level q its revenue is R(q), where R(·) can be non-linear,
as is the case, for instance, with two-part or multi-part pricing. Since firms’ types, their
R&D investments, and their efficiency levels are unobservable, the regulator needs to take into
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account firms’ incentive constraints at both the innovation and market-competition stages when
choosing the market structure {R(·), q(·)}.10
To analyze firms’ incentive constraints, we invoke the revelation principle and consider the
direct mechanism where instead of choosing an efficiency level and output, a firm of type θ
simply reports θ1 (θ2) in the first (second) stage to maximize:
Π(θ) = max
θ1,θ2
{
R(q(θ2))− C(q(θ2)− n(θ1))−Ψ(n(θ1)− θ)
}
(3.1)
This yields the first-order conditions
0 = R′(q(θ))− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)) (3.2)
0 = C ′(q(θ)− n(θ))−Ψ′(n(θ)− θ) (3.3)
The first-order condition (3.2) can be simplified by differentiating a firm’s net profit
Π(θ) = R(q(θ))− C(q(θ)− n(θ))−Ψ(n(θ)− θ) (3.4)
with respect to θ, which together with the first-order condition (3.3) yields Π′(θ) = Ψ′(n(θ)−θ).
Note that this also follows more directly from an Envelope Theorem argument applied to Π(θ)
in (3.1). Firms’ incentive constraints (3.2) and (3.3) can thus be neatly summarized as:
Π′(θ) = Ψ′(n(θ)− θ) = C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)) (3.5)
These incentive constraints can easily be inverted to derive the equilibrium R&D and output
levels. To simplify notation we define the marginal profit schedule pi(θ) ≡ Π′(θ).
Proposition 2. Incentive-compatible R&D and market outputs are characterized by
n(θ) = θ + ψ(pi(θ)) (3.6)
q(θ) = θ + c(pi(θ)) + ψ(pi(θ)) (3.7)
and are non-decreasing in θ.
Note that firms’ innovation and output levels are uniquely determined by the marginal profit
10In most regulation models, e.g. Laffont & Tirole (1993), it is assumed that the regulated firm reveals its
type θ after which efficiency n, output q, and revenue R are determined. In a market context this assumption
is less appealing. Below we therefore allow a firm with efficiency n(θ1) to choose output q(θ2).
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schedule pi(θ). Furthermore, setting the profit of the lowest type, θ, to zero,11 the marginal
schedule determines firms’ net profits as Π(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
pi(t)dt and, hence, revenues as
R(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
pi(t)dt+Ψ(ψ(pi(θ))) + C(c(pi(θ))) (3.8)
To summarize, the market mechanism {R(·), q(·)} is uniquely characterized by the marginal
profit schedule. We show below how to choose pi(·) to maximize welfare.
First, we demonstrate that our model reproduces the positive relation between competition
and innovation typically reported in the empirical literature where competition is measured
using the price-cost margin.
Proposition 3. Innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost margins.
With linear pricing, a lower price-cost margin implies more competition and higher consumer
surplus. With non-linear pricing this is not necessarily the case, e.g. when a monopolist uses a
two-part tariff both the price-cost margin and consumer surplus may be zero. The correct way
to measure competition in this case is to use Definition 1. As we show in the next section this
results in the opposite conclusion, i.e. innovation levels are higher with less competition.
3.1. A Normative Approach
Consider the regulator’s problem of maximizing some welfare standard subject to the incentive
constraints in (3.5). We assume the regulator puts less weight, β ≤ 1, on producer surplus
than on consumer surplus.12 As a consequence, the regulator will optimally set the profit of
the lowest-type firm to zero as assumed above. The planner’s problem is to maximize welfare:
W =
∫ θ
θ
{
U(q(θ))−R(q(θ)) + β(R(q(θ))− C(q(θ)− n(θ))−Ψ(n(θ)− θ))}dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
λ(θ)
(
R′(q(θ))− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)))dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
µ(θ)
(
Ψ′(n(θ)− θ)− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)))dθ
+ ηΠ(θ) (3.9)
11We show below that it is welfare maximizing to do so.
12To illustrate, the DOJ and FTC explicitly state that their “fundamental goals” are “enhancing consumer
welfare and promoting innovation,” see DOJ & FTC (2007).
11
with respect to {R(·), q(·)}. The multipliers λ(·), µ(·) implement the firms’ incentive constraints
and η implements the zero-profit condition for the lowest type, θ.
In the proof of Proposition 4, see the Appendix, we derive the necessary first-order conditions
by optimizing (3.9). Here we follow a simpler approach by using the incentive-compatible
outcomes of Proposition 2 and the expression for revenue in (3.8), which enables us to write
welfare as
W =
∫ θ
θ
W (θ, pi(θ))dF (θ)
where
W (θ, pi) = U(θ + c(pi) + ψ(pi))− C(c(pi))−Ψ(ψ(pi))− (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
pi (3.10)
Note thatW (θ, 0) > 0,13 i.e. there is a social gain even when a firm does not innovate, n(θ) = θ.
Here we focus on the case where firms of all types are R&D active,14 i.e. n(θ) > θ, and discuss
extensions in Section 5.
Assumption 3. Firms of all types are R&D active.
The optimal marginal profit schedule follows by maximizing W (θ, pi) with respect to pi, taking
into account the incentive-compatibility constraints that R&D and market outputs be increas-
ing, see Proposition 2. Note that outputs are increasing if the marginal profit schedule is, a
condition that is readily established when goods are substitutes.
Assumption 4. Products are substitutes, U(q) = q.
As we show in the proof of Proposition 4, with substitutes, the necessary first-order condition
for welfare maximization implies that the marginal profit is increasing.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-4, the optimal market mechanism is characterized by
the marginal profit schedule, pi(θ), that is the unique solution to
(
c′(pi(θ)) + ψ′(pi(θ))
)(
1− pi(θ)) = (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(3.11)
Furthermore, pi(θ) is positive and increasing.
13Here we assume that C(0) = C ′(0) = 0 and Ψ(0) = Ψ′(0) = 0. In particular, there are no fixed costs.
14This condition is met, for instance, when also C ′′(0) = Ψ′′(0) = 0.
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It is important to point out that the “standard” Assumptions 1-4 (convexity of costs, non-
decreasing hazard rate, all firms are R&D active, and substitute products) have been imposed
to simplify the analysis, not because they are necessary conditions for any of the results that
follow. In Section 5 we discuss extensions that relax Assumptions 1-4.
One easy corollary to Proposition 4 is that due to firms’ information rents needed to guar-
antee incentive compatibility, optimal markets are characterized by positive price-cost margins.
Proposition 5. Optimal markets have strictly positive price-cost margins.
To understand this result recall that the price-cost margin is (U ′(q)−C ′(q− n))/U ′(q), which,
using Assumption 4 and the incentive-compatible outputs of Proposition 2, can be written as
1 − pi(θ). The necessary condition (3.11) then implies a strictly positive price-cost margin for
all θ < θ¯.15
Furthermore, (3.11) implies that price-cost margins are lower in dynamic than in static
markets for which ψ(pi(θ)) ≡ 0. However, as we show next this implies that optimal dynamic
markets are less (not more) competitive, i.e. the price-cost margin provides the wrong infor-
mation about the degree of competition in a market.
4. Implications for Market Design
In this section, we explore several comparative statics properties of the optimal market struc-
ture. We first note a useful relation between the competition index of Definition 1 and the
price-cost margin.
Proposition 6. The marginal profit schedule is decreasing in the competition index
pi(θ) = exp
(
−
∫ θ¯
θ
I(t)dt
)
(4.1)
where I(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≤ θ ≤ θ¯, and it is decreasing in the price-cost margin
pi(θ) = 1− PCM(θ) (4.2)
Hence, an increase (decrease) in the optimal marginal profit schedule, which reflects a decrease
(increase) in competition, results in a lower (higher) price-cost margin.
15Boone (2009) makes this point for static industries (possibly with a small number of firms) and shows how
the optimal price-cost margin varies with entry costs.
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In other words, the competition index of Definition 1 results in opposite predictions regarding
the degree of competitiveness in the market than the price-cost margin. The reason is that
with non-linear pricing, the price-cost margin overstates the positive effects of higher outputs
and understates the negative effects of higher firm profits. We illustrate this point in the next
section.
4.1. Consumer versus Producer Surplus
Intuitively, if the regulator puts more weight on producer surplus then firms will be better off
and consumers will be worse off. This comparative static exercise can be used to demonstrate
the shortcomings of the price-cost margin in markets with non-linear pricing. From (3.11), an
increase in β implies that the marginal profit schedule, pi(θ), rises and the price-cost margin
therefore falls. In other words, when more weight is placed on producer surplus, the price-
cost margin erroneously indicates that the market becomes more competitive. In contrast, the
competition measure of Definition 1 predicts a decrease in competition.
To glean some intuition, it is useful to draw an analogy with the situation where a monopolist
sets price equal to marginal cost in a world with two-part tariffs. In our model, as β rises,
innovation levels and output levels go up since n(·) and q(·) are increasing in pi. However, firms’
profits go up as well and consumer surplus falls, just as in the example where a monopolist
uses a two-part tariff.
To show that consumer surplus falls with β in our model, recall that consumer surplus is
given by
CS = W − β
∫ θ¯
θ
(1− F (θ))pi(θ)dθ
Differentiating with respect to β yields
dCS
dβ
= −β
∫ θ¯
θ
(1− F (θ))dpi(θ)
dβ
dθ
which is negative since pi(θ) is increasing in β. The intuition is that while outputs rise, and,
hence, so does U(q(θ)), incentive compatibility requires that firms’ revenues R(q(θ)) rise even
faster, and overall consumer surplus falls.
The lower consumer surplus is the sign of a less competitive market, in contrast with the
prediction of the price-cost margin. The measure of competition in Definition 1 supports this
conclusion: an increase in β raises pi(θ), which implies a lower index I(θ), see (4.1).
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Figure 1: Total welfare, W (θ, pi), consumer welfare, CS(θ, pi), and the price-cost margin,
PCM(θ, pi), for fixed θ = 1/5 as a function of the marginal profit, pi. The welfare-maximizing
marginal profit is denoted pi(θ).
Example 3 (quadratic costs). Suppose R&D and production costs are quadratic, Ψ(z) =
C(z) = 1
2
z2, and firms’ types are uniform on [0, 1]. The optimal marginal profit schedule is
readily calculated as
pi(θ) = 1− 1
2
(1− β)(1− θ)
The conditions of Proposition 2 simplify to:
q(θ) = θ + 2− (1− β)(1− θ)
n(θ) = θ + 1− 1
2
(1− β)(1− θ)
and the price-cost margin is PCM(θ) = 1
2
(1− β)(1− θ). Note that an increase in β lowers the
price-cost margin and raises outputs. At the same time, an increase in β raises firms’ profits
and lowers consumer welfare. The correct measure of competition is
I(θ) = 1
1+β
1−β + θ
which is decreasing in β, i.e. a higher weight on producer surplus results in less competition.
The non-monotonic relationship between the price-cost margin and (consumer) welfare is
illustrated in Figure 1, which is based on the parameters of Example 3. For low values of pi,
the price-cost margin falls with pi and consumer welfare rises. However, for high enough values
of pi, both the price-cost margin and consumer welfare fall with pi. The intuition is that firms’
informational rents, which have to be paid for by the consumers, grow with pi. In other words,
15
while further increases in pi result in more output, increasingly higher revenues are required to
keep these high outputs incentive compatible. The welfare-maximizing level of the marginal
profit is denoted by pi(θ) in Figure 1. Note that at this level, the price-cost margin and consumer
welfare move in the same direction, i.e. a further decrease in the price-cost margin corresponds
to lower consumer welfare.
4.2. Hazard-Rate Dominance
As a second comparative static, suppose the type distribution F (·) hazard-rate dominates G(·),
i.e. f(θ)/(1 − F (θ)) ≤ g(θ)/(1 − G(θ)) for all θ. Recall that hazard-rate dominance implies
first-order stochastic dominance,16 so there is a shift towards higher types under F (·) compared
to G(·). In other words, the type distribution F (·) describes a more competitive situation.
Note that when the hazard rate falls, the right side of (3.11) increases and, hence, the
optimal marginal profit schedule falls. The price-cost margin PCM(θ) therefore predicts a
decrease in competition, while I(θ) correctly predicts an increase in competition, see (4.1).
4.3. Schumpeter’s Conjecture for Dynamic Markets
We say an industry is more dynamic when marginal R&D costs are lower. One tractable way
to parameterize this is to scale the R&D cost function Ψν(z) = ν Ψ(z/ν) where ν > 0, so that
Ψ′ν(z) = Ψ
′(z/ν), and an increase in ν lowers the marginal R&D costs (as Ψ is convex). In
other words, a higher ν corresponds to a more dynamic market and the limit ν = 0 corresponds
to a static market in which innovation is prohibitively costly. The necessary condition (3.11)
becomes: (
ν ψ′(piν(θ)) + c′(piν(θ))
)(
1− piν(θ)
)
= (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(4.3)
where we used that ψν(·) = ν ψ(·).
Proposition 7 (Schumpeter). More dynamic markets should be less competitive.
The logic is that for a more dynamic market with a higher ν, the marginal profit schedule,
piν(θ), has to rise in order to maintain the equality in (4.3) since the left side is decreasing in
piν(θ). Using (4.1) this implies that the competition index Iν(θ) has to fall with ν.
16Since
∫ θ
θ
f(x)/(1− F (x))dx = log(1/(1− F (θ))) ≤ log(1/(1−G(θ))) so F (θ) ≤ G(θ) for all θ.
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Example 3 (continued). It is straightforward to solve for the optimal marginal profit schedule
piν(θ) =
β + ν + (1− β)θ
1 + ν
which is increasing in ν, resulting in a competition index that is decreasing in ν
Iν(θ) = 1ν+β
1−β + θ
4.4. Spillovers
Above we defined dynamic markets in terms of lower marginal R&D costs resulting in higher
levels of innovation. Another characteristic feature of dynamic markets is that spillovers are
important: knowledge or efficiency gains realized by one firm benefit others and have a positive
effect for the sector as a whole. Of course, spillovers may reduce a firm’s incentive to innovate
since others can free ride on its efforts. Another possible interpretation of knowledge spillovers
is therefore one of weak patents. The question we want to address is whether an industry with
more knowledge spillovers should be more (or less) competitive. Or, equivalently, should an
industry with weaker patent protection be more (or less) competitive?17
Let N ≡ ∫ θ
θ
n(θ)dF (θ) denote the average knowledge generated by the industry. Then given
a firm’s efficiency level and the average knowledge in the sector, production costs are:
C
(
q − (1− α)n− αN)
Hence spillovers are increasing in α and the limit α = 0 corresponds to the case of no spillovers,
e.g. when patents offer perfect protection from imitation. The planner’s problem is to maximize
W =
∫ θ
θ
{
U(q(θ))− (1− β)Π(θ)− C(q(θ)− (1− α)n(θ)− αN)−Ψ(n(θ)− θ))}dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
λ(θ)
(
pi(θ)−Ψ′(n(θ)− θ))dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
µ(θ)
(
Ψ′(n(θ)− θ)− (1− α)C ′(q(θ)− (1− α)n(θ)− αN))dθ
+ ξ
(
N −
∫ θ
θ
n(θ)dF (θ)
)
17See DOJ & FTC (2007) for a discussion about the interaction between competition policy and intellectual
property rights.
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Firms’ incentive constraints
pi(θ) = Ψ′(n(θ)− θ) = (1− α)C ′(q(θ)− (1− α)n(θ)− αN)
can be inverted to derive the incentive-compatible market outputs (as in Proposition 2)
n(θ) = θ + ψ(pi(θ))
q(θ) = (1− α)(θ + ψ(pi(θ))) + c( pi(θ)
1− α
)
+ α
∫ θ
θ
(t+ ψ(pi(t)))dF (t)
Using these, welfare can be simplified as W =
∫ θ¯
θ
W (θ, pi(θ))dF (θ) with
W (θ, pi) = θ + c
( pi
1− α
)
+ ψ(pi)− C(c( pi
1− α
))−Ψ(ψ(pi))− (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
pi
where we used the substitutes assumption U(q) = q.
Proposition 8. With spillovers, the optimal market mechanism is characterized by the unique
solution to
ψ′(piα(θ))
(
1− piα(θ)
)
+
1
1− αc
′(piα(θ)
1− α
)(
1− piα(θ)
1− α
)
= (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(4.4)
with piα(θ) positive and increasing. Furthermore, weakening perfect (α = 0) patent protection
is socially beneficial.
The effect of increased spillovers (or weaker patents) on the optimal market structure is com-
plicated by the fact that the marginal profit is not fixed to 1 for the highest possible type,
θ¯. From (4.4) it is easy to see that 1 − α < pi(θ¯) < 1, so the relation between the marginal
profit schedule and the competition index in (4.1) is no longer valid. For the specific setup of
Example 3, however, it is straightforward to determine the optimal combination of innovation
policy and market design.
Example 3 (continued). The optimal marginal profit schedule
piα(θ) =
(1 + β(1− α))(1− α)
1 + (1− α)2 +
(1− β)(1− α)2
1 + (1− α)2 θ
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is increasing in α, resulting in a competition index that is decreasing in α
Iα(θ) = 11
1−α+β
1−β + θ
In other words, weaker patents should be accompanied with less aggressive market competition.
4.5. R&D Subsidies
Besides competition policy there are a number of other instruments the regulator can use to
stimulate innovation, e.g. R&D subsidies in the form of tax-breaks to firms that are paid for by
the consumers. Subsidizing a fraction σ of firms’ R&D costs changes firms’ incentive constraints
to pi(θ) = (1− σ)Ψ′(n− θ), and requires taxation on consumers:
W =
∫ θ
θ
{
U(q(θ))− (1− β)Π(θ)− C(q(θ)− n(θ))−Ψ(n(θ)− θ)}dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
λ(θ)
(
pi(θ)− (1− σ)Ψ′(n(θ)− θ))dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
µ(θ)
(
(1− σ)Ψ′(n(θ)− θ)− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)))dθ
Firms’ incentive constraints
pi(θ) = (1− σ)Ψ′(n(θ)− θ) = C ′(q(θ)− n(θ))
can be inverted to simplify the welfare function to
W (θ, pi) = θ + ψ
( pi
1− σ
)
+ c(pi)− C(c(pi))−Ψ(ψ( pi
1− σ
))− (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
pi
where we used the substitutes condition as before.
Proposition 9. With subsidies, the optimal market mechanism is characterized by the unique
solution to
1
1− σψ
′(piσ(θ)
1− σ
)(
1− piσ(θ)
1− σ
)
+ c′(piσ(θ))
(
1− piσ(θ)
)
= (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(4.5)
with piσ(θ) positive and increasing. Furthermore, small subsidies are socially beneficial.
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Example 3 (continued). The optimal marginal profit schedule is given by
piσ(θ) =
(1 + β(1− σ))(1− σ)
1 + (1− σ)2 +
(1− β)(1− σ)2
1 + (1− σ)2 θ
which is everywhere decreasing in σ also for θ = θ¯. Indeed, ∂σ∂θpiσ(θ) < 0, i.e. the decrease
in the marginal profit due to an increase in σ is largest for θ = θ¯. This implies that Iσ(θ)
must fall with σ, indicating that the market with subsidies should be less competitive. A direct
computation shows
Iσ(θ) = 11
1−σ+β
1−β + θ
which is decreasing in σ, i.e. also subsidies should be accompanied by less aggressive market
competition.
5. Extensions
In this section we demonstrate via illustrative examples how our approach can be applied when
Assumptions 1-4 are not met. Importantly, the relaxation of any of the four assumptions
requires only minor changes in the derivation of the optimal market mechanism.
5.1. R&D Inactivity
Recall that a firm of type θ is R&D inactive when n(θ) = θ, which is socially optimal if the
cost of being active, i.e. the informational rents necessary to maintain incentive compatibility,
exceeds the benefit to consumers.18
Example 4. Suppose costs are quadratic as in Example 3 and the type density is f(θ) = 2θ
for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Welfare is given by
W (θ, pi) = θ + 2pi − pi2 − (1− β)1− θ
2
2θ
pi
and the informational rent term dominates for small θ. Hence, low-type firms are R&D inactive.
Let 0 < θ0 < 1 be the threshold type for which ∂piW (θ0, pi)|pi=0 = 0. Then the optimal market
18Another reason for firms to be inactive is when there are fixed costs, i.e. when C(0) > 0 or Ψ(0) > 0. In
this case, it can be optimal to have an interval of types, [θ, θ0], that do not enter the industry.
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mechanism {R(·), q(·)} is given by
q(θ) =
{
θ if θ ≤ θ0
θ + 2pi(θ) if θ > θ0
and
R(θ) =
{
0 if θ ≤ θ0∫ θ
θ0
pi(t)dt+ pi(θ)2 if θ > θ0
where pi(θ) = 1− 1
4
(1− β)(1/θ − θ) is positive and increasing for θ0 < θ ≤ 1.
To summarize, in the optimal market mechanism, firms with types 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ0 are R&D
inactive and earn zero net profits. For higher-type firms, the optimal marginal profit schedule
is determined as before.
5.2. Non-Convex Marginal Costs
The assumption of convex marginal R&D and production costs guarantees that the optimal
marginal profit schedule is unique. Consider instead the case where R&D and production costs
are convex but marginal costs are not.
Example 5. Suppose firms’ types are uniform on [0, 1] and costs are Ψ(x) = C(x) = 4
3
x
√
x.
The necessary first-order condition for welfare maximization (3.11) becomes
pi(θ)(1− pi(θ)) = (1− β)(1− θ)
First, note that if β < 3/4 there is no solution for types θ ≤ 1 − 1/(4(1 − β)), i.e. low-type
firms are R&D inactive. Second, whenever a solution exists, there are actually two solutions:
either pi(θ) ≤ 1/2 or pi(θ) ≥ 1/2. The second-order condition for welfare maximization is that
1− 2pi(θ) ≤ 0, so only the solution where pi(θ) ≥ 1/2 corresponds to a maximum. For example,
for β = 3/4, the optimal market mechanism {R(·), q(·)} is given by
q(θ) = θ +
pi(θ)2
2
and
R(θ) =
∫ θ
0
pi(t)dt+
pi(θ)3
3
where pi(θ) ≥ 1/2 is the larger solution to pi(θ)(1− pi(θ)) = (1− θ)/4.
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To summarize, when marginal costs are not convex, there may exist multiple solutions to
the necessary first-order condition (3.11). The second-order condition for welfare maximization
selects the solution for which pi′(θ) ≥ 0, similar to the regular case of Section 3.19
5.3. Non-Monotone Hazard Ratio
When the hazard rate is not everywhere decreasing, the marginal profit schedule that solves
the necessary first-order condition (3.11) may not be everywhere non-decreasing. As a result,
R&D and production outputs may be decreasing, which conflicts with incentive compatibility.
The solution in this case is to “iron out” the marginal profit schedule, a well-known procedure
in the study of optimal auctions, see Myerson (1981).
Example 6. Suppose costs are quadratic and the type density is f(θ) = 1
12
+ 11(θ − 1
2
)2 for
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The solution to the first-order condition (3.11) is given by
p˜i(θ) = 1− 1
2
(1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
For β = 3/4, the marginal profit schedule and the associated outputs and revenues are shown
by the dashed lines in the left, middle, and right panels of Figure 2 respectively. Note that
output q˜(θ) = θ+2p˜i(θ) is decreasing for some types and, hence, violates incentive compatibility
(see Proposition 2).
The correct solution for the optimal marginal profit schedule is shown by the solid line
in the left panel of Figure 2. To derive this solution, note that welfare is quadratic in pi(θ)
so it is maximized by choosing pi(θ) to minimize
∫ 1
0
(pi(θ) − p˜i(θ))2dF (θ) under the constraint
pi′(θ) ≥ −1
2
. This is equivalent to choosing q(θ) = θ+2pi(θ) to minimize
∫ 1
0
(q(θ)− q˜(θ))2dF (θ)
under the restriction that q′(θ) ≥ 0. The solid line in the middle panel of Figure 2 solves this
minimization problem since the weighted area between this line and the dashed line adds up
to zero. Finally, the optimal revenue schedule shown by the solid line in the right panel follows
from (3.8). Note that the optimal revenue schedule is flat when the optimal output is, since
(3.8) implies
R′(θ) = pi(θ) q′(θ)
i.e. R′ = 0 when q′ = 0, so low-type firms that produce the same output all receive the same
revenue.
19Let SOCpi < 0 denote the second-order condition for welfare maximization. Then differentiating the first
order condition for pi(θ) yields SOCpi pi′(θ) = (1− β)((1− F (θ)/f(θ))′. This implies pi′(θ) ≥ 0 since SOCpi < 0
and the inverse hazard rate is non-increasing.
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Figure 2: Ironing out the marginal profit schedule (left), output (middle), and revenue (right).
To summarize, when the hazard rate of the type distribution is non-monotone, the optimal
marginal profit schedule follows by applying standard “ironing” techniques to the solution of
the first-order condition for welfare maximization.
5.4. Taste for Variety
When consumers have a taste for variety, the utility function, U(q), is concave. The first-order
condition for welfare maximization
(
c′(pi(θ)) + ψ′(pi(θ))
)(
U ′(θ + c(pi(θ)) + ψ(pi(θ)))− pi(θ)) = (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
no longer implies that pi(θ) is non-decreasing. Hence, the associated output q(θ) is not nec-
essarily non-decreasing, violating incentive compatibility (Proposition 2). As in the previous
example, the solution is to “iron out” the marginal profit schedule.
6. Conclusions
Every micro-economics text book lists the conditions under which perfect competition guaran-
tees welfare-maximizing outcomes. However, in many industries, perfect competition is not the
relevant benchmark. In oligopolistic settings, firms have market power and price-taking behav-
ior cannot realistically be assumed. For a competition authority in charge of regulating such a
sector the relevant question is: should the competition intensity in this industry be increased?
Or, more generally, what industry characteristics determine whether the welfare-maximizing
competition intensity should be low or high? In this paper, we have introduced a general and
tractable framework to analyze this question.
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As an application of our approach, we have confirmed Schumpeter’s conjecture that the
welfare-maximizing level of competition is lower in dynamic sectors compared to static ones.
In other words, it is socially desirable that firms in innovative sectors where R&D is important
enjoy more market power than firms in static industries. Our approach also enables us to
determine how market regulation interacts with policies aimed at stimulating innovation. In
many dynamic markets, firms generate knowledge that cannot be fully appropriated using
patents. Or governments use subsidy schemes to stimulate R&D investments. In an example
we showed that both a weakening of the patent system and the introduction of R&D subsidies
should be accompanied by less aggressive market regulation.
Importantly, our framework can be applied to analyze other sectors. Two examples that
currently have a high policy priority are the finance and health industry. Some people have
argued that the crisis in the banking sector was caused by (too) intense market competition,
which led banks to accept more and more risk in order to stay ahead of rivals. Could more
market power in the finance sector have mitigated the crisis by reducing incentives to take
risks? Since less intense competition reduces profit variability, would bankruptcies have been
less likely? The normative mechanism-design approach put forth in this paper allows us to
study whether optimal competition levels are lower in industries where moral-hazard problems
play an important role.
Another timely application concerns the study of markets with adverse selection such as
the health industry, where perfect competition does not necessarily result in Pareto-efficient
outcomes. Does this imply that less intense competition raises welfare? We intend to extend
our approach to this and other applications in future work.
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A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let φ : IR+ → IR+ denote a convex and increasing function and let
ΠB(θ) = φ(ΠA(θ)). Then
L′′B(θ)
L′B(θ)
− L
′′
A(θ)
L′A(θ)
=
(
φ′(Π(θ))− φ(Π(θ))
Π(θ)
) pi(θ)
φ(Π(θ))
≥ 0
i.e. LB(θ) is more convex than LA(θ). Since LA(θ) = LB(θ) = 0 and LA(θ¯) = LB(θ¯) = 1, a
more convex Lorenz curve implies a downward shift, i.e. LB(θ) ≤ LA(θ) for all θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let θ1 < θ2, then incentive compatibility requires
R(q(θ˜1))− C(q(θ˜1)− n(θ1))−Ψ(n(θ1)− θ1) ≥ R(q(θ˜2))− C(q(θ˜2)− n(θ2))−Ψ(n(θ2)− θ1)
R(q(θ˜2))− C(q(θ˜2)− n(θ2))−Ψ(n(θ2)− θ2) ≥ R(q(θ˜1))− C(q(θ˜1)− n(θ1))−Ψ(n(θ1)− θ2)
for all θ˜1, θ˜2. Adding these inequalities yields
Ψ(n(θ2)− θ1)−Ψ(n(θ2)− θ2) ≥ Ψ(n(θ1)− θ1)−Ψ(n(θ1)− θ2),
so the result that n(·) is increasing follows if and only if Ψ(x− θ1)−Ψ(x− θ2) is increasing in
x. Equivalently, Ψ′(x− θ1) ≥ Ψ′(x− θ2), which holds if and only if Ψ′(·) is increasing, i.e. Ψ(·)
is convex. The proof that q(·) is increasing is similar. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The price-cost margin is given by
PCM(θ) ≡ U
′(q(θ))− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ))
U ′(q(θ))
= 1− pi(θ)/U ′(θ + c(pi(θ)) + ψ(pi(θ))) (A.1)
Since U ′′ ≤ 0, the price-cost margin is decreasing in pi(θ). Innovation levels, however, are
increasing in pi(θ), see (3.6). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the expression for the firm’s net profit (3.4) we can reformulate
welfare as
W =
∫ θ
θ
{
U(q(θ))− (1− β)Π(θ)− C(q(θ)− n(θ))−Ψ(n(θ)− θ))}dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
λ(θ)
(
pi(θ)−Ψ′(n(θ)− θ))dθ
+
∫ θ
θ
µ(θ)
(
Ψ′(n(θ)− θ)− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)))dθ
+ ηΠ(θ) (A.2)
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which now has to be maximized with respect to {Π(·), q(·)}. The first-order condition with
respect to Π(·), together with the transversality condition λ(θ¯) = 0, implies:
λ(θ) = (1− β)(1− F (θ)) (A.3)
The first-order condition with respect to q(·) is
(
U ′(q(θ))− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)))f(θ)− µ(θ)C ′′(q(θ)− n(θ)) = 0,
and the first-order condition for n(·) is
λ(θ)Ψ′′(n(θ)− θ)− µ(θ)(C ′′(q(θ)− n(θ)) + Ψ′′(n(θ)− θ)) = 0.
So µ(θ) = λ(θ)Ψ′′/(C ′′ +Ψ′′) and the first-order condition for q(·) can be rewritten as
U ′(q(θ))− C ′(q(θ)− n(θ)) = (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
C ′′(q(θ)− n(θ))Ψ′′(n(θ)− θ)
C ′′(q(θ)− n(θ)) + Ψ′′(n(θ)− θ) (A.4)
Note that output is distorted compared to the first-best solution (U ′ = C ′) except at the top,
θ = θ, where the hazard ratio vanishes. Assumption 3 implies n(θ) > θ and thus pi(θ) > 0.
Using the definitions of the supply functions ψ(z) = Ψ′(−1)(z) and c(z) = C ′(−1)(z) and the
incentive constraints in (3.5), the first-order condition (A.4) can be rewritten as(
c′(pi(θ)) + ψ′(pi(θ))
)(
U ′(θ + c(pi(θ)) + ψ(pi(θ)))− pi(θ)) = (1− β)1− F (θ)
f(θ)
The left side is strictly decreasing in pi(θ) since c(·), ψ(·) and U(·) are concave, so the solution
is unique. Moreover, U ′(q) = 1 when products are substitutes, in which case there is no explicit
θ dependence on the left side while the right side is decreasing in θ. Hence, pi′(θ) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. From (A.1) and (A.4) we conclude that the price-cost margin is
proportional to (1− β)(1− F (θ))/f(θ) since Ψ′′ > 0, C ′′ > 0, and U ′ > 0. The inverse hazard
rate is positive for all θ < θ¯. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Note from (3.11) that pi(θ¯) = 1. Recall that I(θ) = pi′(θ)/pi(θ) =
∂θ log(pi(θ)), which, upon integration and using the boundary condition pi(θ¯) = 1, yields (4.1).
Moreover, the ratio pi′(θ)/pi(θ) is positive since the optimal marginal profit schedule is positive
and increasing (see Proposition 4). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let ν1 > ν2, and suppose, in contradiction, that Iν1(θ) > Iν2(θ) for
some θ. From (4.1) this implies that piν1(θ) < piν2(θ) for some θ, which yields a contradiction
since the left-side of (4.3) is decreasing in piν(θ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. Note that the left side of (4.4) is strictly decreasing in piα(θ) since
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c(·) and ψ(·) are concave, so the solution piα(θ) is unique. Furthermore, the left side of (4.4)
has no explicit θ dependence while the right side is non-increasing in θ, so pi′α(θ) ≥ 0. Using an
envelope argument shows that
dW
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
∫ θ
θ
(1− pi(θ))pi(θ)c′(pi(θ))dF (θ) > 0
so welfare rises with α when α is small. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof that piσ(θ) is unique, positive, and increasing follows from
similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 8. An envelope argument shows that
dW
dσ
∣∣∣∣
σ=0
=
∫ θ
θ
(1− pi(θ))pi(θ)ψ′(pi(θ))dF (θ) > 0
so welfare rises with σ when σ is small. Q.E.D.
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